NV exclusive
Defense
Near the front line south of Zaporizhzhya, Ukrainian paratroopers say a carefully prepared offensive has begun to unsettle Russian defenses after months of stalemate. NV journalist Serhii Okunev visited positions held by the 95th Air Assault Brigade, which was urgently redeployed to the sector in January, and spoke with commanders who described the operation in detail.
The interviews provide one of the first detailed accounts from Ukrainian troops involved in the recent counterattacks in southern Ukraine, which have fueled speculation about the scale of Kyiv’s offensive.
Ukrainian forces have already retaken about 460 square kilometers in the south, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said, in what analysts say are the largest Ukrainian counteroffensive actions in the region since the summer of 2023.
A brigade built for offense
The 95th Air Assault Brigade has developed a reputation as one of Ukraine’s most mobile combat units — repeatedly sent to stabilize the most difficult sectors of the front during Russia’s full-scale invasion.
In 2022 the brigade pushed Russian troops away from the strategically important Izyum–Sloviansk highway before joining the Kharkiv counteroffensive that autumn. It later participated in the first phase of Ukraine’s operation in Russia’s Kursk Oblast in 2024.
After breaking across the Russian border during that campaign, Ukrainian paratroopers shifted to defense and for months repelled Russian assaults in Kursk Oblast, including attacks involving North Korean units. Later they held a critical defense sector in Sumy Oblast when Russian forces attempted to advance toward the city of Sumy.
When Russia’s northern offensive stalled, the brigade was redeployed to the intense Pokrovsk sector, where it completed several urgent missions before receiving new orders.
At the end of January 2026 the 95th Brigade was ordered to urgently move south to the Zaporizhzhya sector, where Russian forces had captured significant territory during the autumn and launched battles for a key Ukrainian defensive line around the city of Huliaipole.
Those advances created a serious threat to Zaporizhzhya, the regional capital. Ukrainian forces had been retreating in the sector for several months.
Moving an entire brigade — including armored vehicles, artillery, headquarters units and assault groups — is a complex operation requiring careful coordination. The 95th had to move quickly, avoid detection and enter combat almost immediately after arriving.
Earlier in the winter several Assault Forces units were publicly redeployed to the Huliaipole area. According to a source in Ukraine’s Southern Defense Forces who spoke to NV on condition of anonymity, that publicity may have been intended to distract Russian forces from tracking the movement of several Ukrainian brigades, including the 95th.
NV cannot disclose the full composition of Ukrainian forces operating in the sector, but at least one additional brigade with experience in offensive operations moved south alongside the 95th.
“It’s difficult to say whether the plan really was to distract the enemy with assault regiments and conceal the movement of Air Assault Forces units,” the source said. “But in practice that’s exactly how it worked.”
Foreign OSINT analysts tracked Ukrainian offensive activity from the first day, but even they did not immediately detect the presence of the 95th Brigade in the Zaporizhzhya sector.
“Overall this isn’t something new for us. We already had experience moving quickly and starting combat operations while still deploying on a sector,” said the commander of the brigade’s 1st Air Assault Battalion, whose call sign is One Four.
“Some of our assault units were already conducting offensive actions and achieving success while the rest of the brigade was still arriving. But these were organized actions. That’s how we operate.”
Number-based call signs among command staff are a long-standing tradition within Ukraine’s Air Assault Forces.
The battalion commander joined the brigade during the ATO/JFO period. His battalion later achieved significant successes in Kursk Oblast, fought North Korean units and captured numerous Russian prisoners of war for future exchanges.
Now his soldiers are actively participating in the offensive south of Zaporizhzhya.
‘We managed to sow chaos among the occupiers’
One Four speaks calmly even when describing intense assaults. But when discussing the successes of his soldiers, his tone becomes noticeably more animated.
“There was a case a few days ago. Our assault group captured a strongpoint and fought for it for a long time. Now it’s a position we are using to develop further offensive actions,” he said.
During the clearing operation, the soldiers captured an enemy radio and began listening to Russian communications. The radio traffic included insults aimed at Ukrainians.
“The soldiers told their commander: we can’t just leave that like that — we need to deal with it,” he said. “They went to attack the very position from which those insults were coming over the radio.”
The position was captured even though it had not originally been assigned as an objective.
“They attacked successfully. Now we’ve secured it.”
At the start of the Ukrainian attacks, many analysts linked the offensive to Russian forces losing access to Starlink satellite internet on the front line.
Some even suggested the offensive began because Russian units were cut off from the system.
“Starlink for the occupiers stopped working several days after we had already begun the offensive,” One Four said.
“Our actions were not triggered by that shutdown. By that time we already knew our tasks, were moving and preparing.”
He acknowledged that communication disruptions benefited Ukrainian forces but warned against exaggerated expectations.
“If someone thinks Starlink stopped working and now the enemy will run dozens of kilometers like during the Kharkiv operation — that’s not the case.”
“Yes, it created problems for them. It gave us advantages. But their infantry is still in its positions.”
Their drone operators remain positioned farther from the zero line, he said, where they can still maintain some communication.
Reconnaissance had revealed significant organizational weaknesses among Russian troops in the sector.
Russian forces here were fragmented and poorly coordinated. Neighboring units sometimes did not even know the positions of adjacent formations.
“We took advantage of that,” the commander said.
During the first days of the offensive, some Ukrainian assault groups infiltrated behind Russian defensive lines and positioned themselves inside Russian defensive areas.
When the main Ukrainian assault began, those small units attacked Russian positions from within.
“While our main forces carried out assaults, our diversionary actions in the rear created the impression that we had already advanced much deeper,” One Four said.
Russian forward positions began losing track of where their rear actually was.
Although the diversionary operations involved only small numbers of soldiers, they created confusion among Russian troops. Combined with communication problems and rumors of deep Ukrainian breakthroughs, the attacks triggered panic.
Some Russian units began retreating.
Intercepted radio communications included calls for Russian soldiers to abandon artillery and flee because Ukrainian paratroopers had allegedly broken deep into their defenses.
At certain moments the battalion even used armored vehicles to support the advance.
Enemy panic also helped create opportunities for advances by other Ukrainian units.
One Four described another episode during the fighting.
“There was a situation when our soldiers captured one position and eliminated the enemy there,” he said.
“There were wooden pallets on the floor. Our soldiers threw some bags on top to make it more comfortable.”
A day later they heard a voice from beneath the pallets.
“Guys, I surrender.”
An enemy soldier had hidden there during the assault, hoping the Ukrainian troops would soon leave so he could escape.
After a day he realized he was trapped.
“So he surrendered,” the commander said.
The diversionary group that helped create panic among Russian troops returned without losses and continues to participate in combat operations.
How big is the offensive?
As the first reports of Ukrainian attacks appeared online, debates quickly emerged about their scale.
Some observers began describing the operation as a “counteroffensive.” Ukrainian soldiers currently fighting in Zaporizhzhya Oblast caution against exaggerated conclusions.
A true counteroffensive usually involves large-scale breakthroughs and sustained advances across multiple sectors.
“For now we are not talking about sectors, settlements or scale,” said an officer from the 95th Air Assault Brigade.
“We have a principle: only when we fully control a settlement, when our checkpoint stands there and we can safely drive there — only then do we say it has been liberated.”
One Four also rejects claims that the offensive has slowed after the first days of success.
“My groups are successfully attacking today as well,” he said.
“Modern war doesn’t look like five days of rapid advance followed by two days of pause that would mean the attack is over.”
“There are waves. There are enemy strongpoints. The key question is whether we still have the ability to advance.”
“I believe we do.”
Military textbooks often suggest that offensive operations produce higher casualties than defensive fighting. But the battalion commander said modern warfare — especially under constant drone surveillance — does not always follow those rules.
“Have losses increased significantly? I can say they have actually decreased. That’s not a joke.”
Compared with the final phase of the Kursk operation, when Ukrainian troops were already defending, losses during the current offensive have been significantly lower, he said.
Some people imagine columns of armored vehicles and hundreds of soldiers charging across open fields like in Soviet war movies.
“But a modern offensive — especially in a drone war — looks completely different.”
Small assault groups operate in coordination with drones, artillery and sometimes armored vehicles. Their losses are limited.
Defensive positions under constant drone and artillery fire can be even more dangerous.
“Try sitting in defense when artillery hits you 24 hours a day, when your position has long been detected, when drones attack every hour and logistics become difficult,” he said.
“Would losses really be lower in those conditions?”
A brigade officer confirmed that according to medical data, the number of wounded during offensive operations can sometimes be lower than during defensive fighting under intense enemy attacks.
Still, the enemy’s resistance should not be underestimated, and the operation is not without risk.
On the day of NV’s interview with the battalion commander, his unit was evacuating a damaged Humvee from the battlefield.
All soldiers were rescued and none were injured.