In 1994, Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons in exchange for security guarantees. Russia invaded anyway. Now, more nations ask: Why disarm if those promises mean nothing?
Vira Kravchuk
April 19, 2025
Euromaidan Press
Despite US President Trump’s claim that “it would be great if everyone got rid of nuclear weapons,” global arsenals are expanding for the first time in decades, with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine shattering the fragile nuclear non-proliferation order.
While Trump acknowledges the “crazy” destructive power of these weapons, the gap between disarmament rhetoric and reality widens. The Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor reports nuclear weapons ready for use increased from 9,585 to 9,604 between early 2024 and 2025—equivalent to over 146,500 Hiroshima-sized bombs. Each represents enough destructive capacity to erase a city from existence.
Ukraine’s experience demonstrates the consequences of trusting in international promises. In 1994, under the Budapest Memorandum, it surrendered the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal in exchange for security guarantees from Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. When tested, those guarantees failed completely.
Russia violated the agreement through its 2014 and 2022 invasions. Western powers, meanwhile, responded with hesitation, delay, and legalistic redefinitions. The truth is simple: Ukraine disarmed in good faith—only to find its security guarantees worthless when it mattered most.
This failure has transformed nuclear disarmament from a moral triumph into a strategic liability. As Russia issues nuclear threats and China expands its arsenal, countries once sheltered under the US nuclear umbrella are rethinking their security.
The question is no longer whether nuclear proliferation will accelerate—but how fast, how far, and at what cost.
Nuclear blackmail works—just ask Ukraine
After the onset of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin warned that any NATO interference would trigger consequences “such as you have never seen in your entire history,” while ordering Russian nuclear forces into a heightened alert status.
While often dismissed by experts as empty posturing, these threats slowed crucial Western support for Ukraine. Weapons systems that could have changed the course of battles were delayed for months while officials debated Putin’s “red lines”—many of which later proved meaningless.
“Every new weapon system has been very carefully considered for its escalatory potential,” Mariana Budjeryn, a senior researcher at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center, told Euromaidan Press. “It took time to get approved, because there were fears that Russia might retaliate with a nuclear strike in Ukraine. And that has certainly cost Ukraine lost opportunities on the battlefield and certainly has cost Ukraine many more lives.”
The threat remains real. A March 2025 US intelligence report to the Senate Intelligence Committee warns, “Russia’s inability to achieve quick and decisive battlefield wins, coupled with Ukrainian strikes within Russia, continues to drive concerns that Putin might use nuclear weapons.”
Russia has systematically undermined nuclear security beyond mere threats. By withdrawing from the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 2023 and expanding its nuclear doctrine to include more scenarios for potential nuclear weapon use, Russia has deliberately heightened global tensions.
Perhaps most alarmingly, Russia’s occupation of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in Ukraine—Europe’s largest nuclear facility—demonstrated a willingness to use civilian nuclear infrastructure as both shield and weapon.
The message to non-nuclear states is disturbingly clear: perhaps your only reliable security may lie in possessing nuclear weapons yourself.
Ukraine disarmed, then Russia invaded
When François Mitterrand leaned toward Ukraine’s president in 1994 and whispered, “Young man, you will be tricked, one way or the other,” he wasn’t just being cynical—he was predicting the future, as Ukraine’s former president Leonid Kuchma revealed in 2009.
Under the Budapest Memorandum, Ukraine surrendered approximately 1,900 strategic nuclear weapons. In exchange, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom pledged to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty, refrain from threats or coercion, and provide assistance if Ukraine faced aggression. At the same time, China and France offered similar assurances through separate documents. “We said the United States would do something; we would show interest,” former US ambassador to Ukraine Steven Pifer, who helped negotiate the memorandum, explains to Euromaidan Press. “But we made it clear, ‘We’re telling you now, that doesn’t mean we’re going to send American troops to defend Ukraine.’ So it’s a security assurance memorandum, not a security guarantee.”
This critical distinction between “assurances” and “guarantees” was further complicated by translation discrepancies. While the English version specified “assurances,” the Russian and Ukrainian versions were titled “Memorandum on Security Guarantees”—a subtle difference with profound implications. Regardless of terminology, all versions were signed by the same parties, committing to the same promises.
Russia’s violations began subtly with the 2003 Tuzla Island dispute and escalated with economic pressure against Ukraine’s EU Association Agreement in 2013. These early transgressions
foreshadowed the dramatic ruptures to come—Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and its 2022 full-scale invasion—that have shattered what was once considered a cornerstone of post-Cold War security.
The memorandum’s failure reverberated beyond Ukraine, creating what Mariana Budjeryn calls “a crisis of confidence in the non-proliferation regime.”
Budjeryn argues that after signing the memorandum, Ukraine missed crucial opportunities. “The Budapest Memorandum should have become a framework for cooperating with the signatories,” she explains. Instead, it was “shelved for 20 years,” gathering dust while Ukraine’s vulnerabilities multiplied.
Western responses to Russia’s violations varied dramatically. After the 2014 Crimea annexation, the Obama administration’s response amounted to what Budjeryn describes as “not even a proper wrist slapping.”
Meanwhile, France and Germany lacked the leverage and political will to pressure Russia effectively. Germany was simultaneously pursuing the Nord Stream 2 pipeline with Russia, creating an apparent conflict of interest.
Even Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 prompted only measured Western support. Many analysts argue the military aid Ukraine received was deliberately calibrated—enough to prevent Ukraine’s collapse but insufficient to retake occupied territories or decisively win the war against Russia. This “minimal sufficiency” appears to be a calculated Western strategy rather than an oversight.
Pifer believes the Biden administration’s $100+ billion in assistance is “certainly consistent with what we were talking about 30 years ago.” However, the Trump administration’s approach raised concerns by reportedly conditioning military aid on Ukraine signing a minerals deal, potentially violating the memorandum’s prohibition on economic coercion. In the shadow of broken promises, Ukraine now fights not just for territory but also for the integrity of international agreements, challenging the dangerous precedent that powerful nations can disregard their commitments without consequences.
When Russia broke the rules, the world reached for the bomb
Ukraine’s struggle—surrendering nuclear weapons only to face invasion by a nuclear power—raises a critical question for nations sheltered by others’ nuclear umbrellas: What happens when security promises fail?
The diplomatic architecture preventing nuclear proliferation is cracking. For decades, America’s nuclear umbrella convinced allies they didn’t need their own arsenals. That calculation now faces its greatest test.
Trump’s Russia-friendly stance and NATO skepticism forced allies into uncomfortable strategic recalculations. Germany, Poland, South Korea, and Japan now quietly consider once-taboo scenarios: preparing for a world without American nuclear protection. “The Trump phenomenon has provided a powerful accelerant for voices in US-allied states who now see nuclear weapons
in their own hands as fundamentally solving the problem posed by American unreliability,” said Ankit Panda of the Carnegie Endowment think-tank.
In March 2025, French President Emmanuel Macron took the extraordinary step of proposing to extend France’s nuclear deterrent across Europe. “Thanks to choices made after World War II, we are equipped with nuclear deterrence capabilities that protect us far more than many of our neighbors,” Macron declared. “I’ve decided to begin strategic discussions on safeguarding the entire continent with our nuclear weapons.”
Nuclear hedging extends well beyond Europe. South Korea, living under constant North Korean threats, appears increasingly tempted by the nuclear option. “If South Korea loses confidence in the American nuclear deterrent, nuclear weapons acquisition will quickly become a mainstream political position there,” Pifer cautions.
In parallel moves, the UK is doubling down on its nuclear capabilities. Prime Minister Keir Starmer recently celebrated the country’s Trident submarine program as an “incredibly effective deterrent” while launching the construction of the new Dreadnought-class submarines—the largest ever built for the Royal Navy. “We’re seeing a three-way nuclear arms race between the United States, Russia, and China,” warns Pifer, noting China’s dramatic expansion toward 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030. “I think if the United States builds up, then Russia will build up,” he cautions.
Each move by one power triggers countermoves by others—a dangerous spiral reminiscent of the 1960s when nations learned the hard way that nuclear buildups create cost and risk without delivering security.
Left out of NATO, Ukraine eyes the bomb again
Steven Pifer, who helped negotiate the memorandum, argues that Ukraine’s decision to relinquish nuclear weapons was pragmatic. Maintaining Soviet nuclear weapons would have been prohibitively expensive since the support infrastructure existed primarily in Russia. Moreover, keeping nuclear arms would have likely isolated Ukraine internationally rather than facilitating European integration. “Ukraine might not have been a pariah state in the same sense as North Korea, but I think it would have found it had very cool relations at best with the West,” Pifer explains. “And any crisis with Russia, it would have been facing Russia alone.”
However, he acknowledges a critical blind spot: neither side truly anticipated that Russia would ever use military force against Ukraine. “Had there been a substantial belief that Russia might someday attack, the negotiations leading to denuclearization might have failed altogether.”
Today, Ukraine’s security equation has fundamentally changed. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy frames the dilemma with brutal clarity: “Either Ukraine will have nuclear weapons for defense, or Ukraine will be in NATO. NATO countries aren’t at war today. People are alive in NATO countries. That’s why we choose NATO over nuclear weapons.”
This shift is reflected in Ukrainian public opinion. According to a December 2024 survey by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 73% of Ukrainians now support restoring the country’s
nuclear arsenal—a dramatic shift from 1994, when only 30% favored nuclear weapons. Even if restoration triggered Western sanctions and loss of support, 46% would still pursue the nuclear option.
Yet Ukraine’s preferred solution faces significant obstacles. Donald Trump described Ukraine’s NATO accession as unrealistic, while US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth expressed concerns that such a move would escalate tensions with Russia.
As Pifer explains: “If Ukraine were to come into NATO while Ukraine is still at war with Russia, under Article 5, then NATO countries immediately have a tough decision. Are they prepared to go to war against Russia?” particularly as Russia threatens to retaliate with nuclear attacks.
Plan B for Ukraine’s security
Despite the Budapest Memorandum’s failure, potential security frameworks for Ukraine still exist. Steven Pifer outlines two promising alternatives:
- A “coalition of the willing” – European countries making security commitments to Ukraine
- The “porcupine strategy” – Massive military equipment support enabling Ukraine to deter Russia through overwhelming conventional strength.
Ukrainian officials insist on guarantees with real enforcement mechanisms. Parliament security committee secretary Roman Kostenko argues any commitments must include specific response plans for future Russian aggression—“even up to the use of nuclear weapons.” His proposal is direct: in case of any attack, France should deploy forces to Ukraine’s borders, Germany should enforce a no-fly zone, and France and the UK should prepare nuclear strikes against Russia.
Zelenskyy’s frustration is palpable: “If NATO membership takes decades, what will be defending us against this evil for this whole time? Which missiles? Will we be given nuclear weapons?”
His direct war-ending plan pulls no punches: “Give us back nuclear arms. Help finance our million-strong army and deploy your forces where we need stability.”
Harvard researcher Mariana Budjeryn also evolved her thinking. While once advocating NATO membership as the solution, she now suggests Ukraine needs “a long enough period of armistice” to build domestic defense capabilities with Western support. “Ukraine is already producing three million drones a year,” she notes. “This is a very different type of warfare that the United States is prepared for. So I think Ukraine has to achieve a long enough period of stability somehow where it basically can have an opportunity to provide for its own security.”
It’s not too late to restore nuclear trust
The global crisis of nuclear non-proliferation is increasingly evident. The Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) faces unprecedented challenges, with both the 2015 and 2022 Review Conferences failing to produce consensus documents due to Russian obstruction.
Andreas Umland, a German political scientist, highlights the fundamental inequity in the current system: “The NPT allows Russia, as an official nuclear-weapon state, to build and acquire atomic warheads. At the same time, the NPT explicitly forbids Ukraine, as an official non-nuclear-weapon state, to do the same.”
Despite these troubling weaknesses, the situation isn’t hopeless. With sustained Western commitment, Ukraine could establish a reliable security model that might not only deter Russia but also help transform it into a prosperous European nation.
To preserve the non-proliferation regime, Umland proposes three urgent steps: providing Ukraine with sufficient military support to achieve victory, demanding Russia end its nuclear threats, and transforming the Budapest Memorandum’s paper assurances into a fully-fledged military alliance.
The key lesson is clear: security guarantees require operational depth and meaningful enforcement mechanisms. Without these elements, they remain mere words, easily violated when geopolitical interests shift. “The failure of the Budapest Memorandum and the crisis of confidence it has generated may well be the most significant nuclear security challenge of our time,” concludes Budjeryn. “How we address it will determine not just Ukraine’s future but the future of nuclear non-proliferation for decades to come.”
Vira Kravchuk studied Contemporary Communication at LCC International University in Lithuania, Klaipeda. Lithuania is perfect for people who enjoy their time alone and value their personal space and calmness. That says a bit about me. I’m an introvert who needs to socialize from time to time. I enjoy listening to people, remembering their stories, and noticing details. I see the meaning in creation and art, in how anything can be shaped into a story, and convey a message and feelings. This is a way to communicate with people, persuade them, or just evoke emotions, through texts, photos, or videos. My life goal is to master this skill. I have content creation experience at the university’s online newspaper, creative nonfiction journal, content creation company, health coaching app, and film festivals. I am skilled in academic/non-academic writing, researching, text editing, interviewing people, and basic photography/video editing. Reading books is my passion. I write and film short book reviews in Ukrainian/English. Writing stories is my other passion. I also love watching and analyzing films, understanding the logic behind some shots and lines. I write fiction stories and screenplays. My memoir and a short fiction story were published in a university creative journal “Calliope”. My theater script was staged at the LCC International University. I also finished a screenplay for a short film and other short stories both in English and Ukrainian.