Transitions
Sept 9, 2025
Marta Prochwicz Jazowska
Poland’s political infighting and rising anti-Ukrainian sentiment are weakening its ability to lead on European security and undermine its crucial role in supporting Ukraine against Russia.
Poland was once Ukraine’s most vocal supporter. Now the government is preoccupied with its own battle: as Poland attempts to secure its own sovereignty against Russia, its politicians disagree on how to deal with those Ukrainians who are making Poland their home. This struggle is undermining Poland’s effectiveness in the Ukrainian war effort, constraining Polish foreign policy, and leaving Poland’s key allies unsure of its position toward Ukraine. For Europeans, Poland’s domestic paralysis is actively undermining the entire Western response to Russia’s actions at the most critical moment for European security since the Cold War.
Poland’s External War
Poland views Russia’s war against Ukraine as the first stage of a Moscow-led imperialist project that threatens Polish sovereignty. Effectively, this means Poland is equating its own struggle against Russian expansionism with Ukraine’s resistance against Vladimir Putin: Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk remarked in March 2025 that “Poland’s national interest requires unequivocal, lasting support for Ukraine in its defense against Russian aggression. This is non-negotiable.”
As such, since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Poland has provided extensive military and political support while mobilizing assistance among its allies. Poland is the main logistics hub in Europe for defense and humanitarian aid, with 80% of military donations transiting through the country. Between 2022 and 2024, the country spent 40 billion euros (1.9% of its GDP) on defense and humanitarian aid for Ukraine, including refugee costs. It has also delivered 47 military aid packages to date – a feat that continues, despite the risk of Russian strikes on Polish territory. Poland is also engaged against Russia diplomatically: in July 2024, Tusk signed a bilateral security agreement with Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskiy to provide military assistance, defense industry cooperation, and support for Ukraine’s NATO and EU membership bids. Poland also participates in, for example, the Ukraine Defense Contact Group and has imposed its own sanctions against Russia while actively supporting European efforts to weaken Russia’s economy. Poland is also a member of the “Coalition of the Willing,” co-chaired by Britain and France, whose members last week pledged strong defense support for Ukraine.
However, Poland has explicitly ruled out deploying troops based on several strategic and operational concerns. First, Warsaw’s attitude is that token peacekeeping or reassurance forces are inadequate to address the scale of Russia’s threat, and could even derail meaningful
deterrence initiatives. Instead, Poland is advocating a comprehensive containment strategy – built around NATO – that actively isolates Russia, counters its hybrid operations, and demonstrates long-term support for Ukraine. This requires credible deterrence based on the “three Cs”: building Ukraine’s military capacity, unambiguous political and military commitment to Ukraine, and clear strategic communication. The Polish view is that small-scale troop deployments would not provide Ukraine with sufficient defensive capability, nor demonstrate to Moscow that the West has moved beyond symbolic responses to match Russia’s escalatory trajectory.
Poland’s second concern is an accurate threat assessment. Poland is the non-nuclear NATO member geographically closest to Russia and most targeted by cyberattacks. Recent ECFR polling shows that Poland is, among its European counterparts, the most concerned about a direct Russian attack or a third world war. Indeed, Poland faces immediate threats on multiple fronts. Russia’s heavily fortified Kaliningrad exclave, positioned between Poland and Lithuania, houses advanced S-400 anti-access missile systems. Russian forces used Belarus as a staging ground for a Ukraine invasion. Should Russia overpower Ukraine, Vladimir Putin would control Poland’s entire eastern border except the 68-mile (109 km) Suwalki Gap that connects it to the Baltic states. And Putin recently announced that any Western troops sent to Ukraine would be legitimate targets. According to ECFR sources, Russian officials see Poland’s public position of supporting Ukraine via military transfers and economic and humanitarian means (rather than direct combat) as “wise.”
A third concern for Warsaw is whether European countries committing national troops to Ukraine – despite the continent’s dearth of military resources – would compromise any previously agreed NATO regional defense plans. NATO members and EU member states are inadequately protected for Russian aggression on NATO territory. As such, any military commitment to Ukraine should not weaken the alliance’s eastern flank (including Poland) and put it at a higher risk of attack. Finally, Poland’s willingness to serve as a logistics hub for Ukraine was predicated on the U.S. acting alongside it. Warsaw’s support for Ukraine initially depended on securing U.S. commitment for its own defense. However, this deal seems increasingly unlikely to materialize under the second Trump presidency. The United States has explicitly ruled out ground deployments, instead limiting its security guarantees to intelligence, surveillance, and air support.
Ultimately, while Poland has compelling military and strategic reasons for not deploying troops, allies who view Poland as a linchpin in Europe’s resistance against Russia met Tusk’s stance of “no Polish troops in Ukraine” with surprise. Poland’s decision has contributed to the image – internationally and domestically – that its support for Ukraine has decreased and is undermining Poland’s ability to leverage European support for its own security concerns.
Poland’s Internal War: Political Survival
Away from military concerns, Poland’s government is also divided over its domestic handling of Ukrainians living in the country. Public attitudes are changing: in May 2022, 67% of Poles believed that it would be “good for Poland if Ukrainians currently staying in Poland were to stay
for many years.” However, in 2025, the number of people favorable toward Ukrainians in Poland fell to 45%, with 86% of Poles also opposing sending Polish soldiers to Ukraine.
Given these odds, it is likely that any head of state who publicly says they will send soldiers into battle will lose an election. And political campaigning in the run-up to Poland’s presidential election, which took place in May 2025, coincided with – and fueled – such rising anti-Ukrainian sentiment among the Polish public. During the presidential campaign, Civic Coalition (KO) party candidate Rafal Trzaskowski imitated his right-wing rival Karol Nawrocki’s anti-Ukrainian stance by shifting to supporting limits on social welfare for Ukrainian migrants. At the same time, Tusk (also of KO) announced that Poland would not send troops to Ukraine.
Poland’s internal paralysis became clearer once Nawrocki won the presidency. While both Nawrocki and Tusk acknowledge that Poland must support Ukraine externally, Nawrocki’s veto on a bill put forward by Tusk to extend welfare assistance for Ukrainian citizens inflamed Polish anti-Ukrainian sentiment. His move turned welfare policy into a wedge issue that has further divided Poles and Ukrainians – a domestic political dysfunction that will continue for at least the next two years, until the next parliamentary election. The effects were visible in both Tusk and Nawrocki’s absence from the meeting of European leaders in Washington on 18 August.
Polish security policy, which is premised on support for Ukraine against Russian aggression, is therefore becoming hostage to election cycles. Conversely, Tusk’s reasons for not sending troops to Ukraine are militarily and operationally sound. Now this inconsistent messaging from Warsaw’s power centers is confusing allies regarding Poland’s actual position on Ukraine and threatens to undermine its key role in European security affairs.
Backbone of the Western Response
Overall, Poland’s clear early red line regarding “no boots on the ground,” a lack of clear communication on what acting as a backstop to a reassurance mission in Ukraine really means, deteriorating domestic Polish-Ukrainian relations, infighting among ideologically opposed members of the strained parliamentary republic, and confusion about who leads foreign policy in Poland are all causing uncertainty among its allies regarding what Poland can actually deliver for Ukraine. Crucially, this paralysis weakens the entire Western response precisely when unity and strength are most critical.
In April 2025, in his yearly address to the Polish parliament, Deputy Prime Minister Radoslaw Sikorski characterized the international situation as the most difficult environment since 1989. Poland’s allies, including the United States, will not wait indefinitely for clarity. Russia will not pause its aggression while Warsaw sorts out its domestic disputes. Instead, the price of prioritizing internal political survival over external strategic leadership will manifest in Poland’s diminished role in European politics.
Marta Prochwicz Jazowska is the Warsaw deputy head at ECFR, where this article originally appeared. Republished by permission.