David Kirichenko
15 August 2025
Lowy Institute
Throughout the invasion, Kyiv has fought an asymmetric campaign to offset Russia’s numerical advantage in soldiers and personnel. Cheap drones, or also unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have become the backbone of Ukraine’s defence. Now, unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) are poised to be the next defining technology, extending this shield from the air to the ground.
Ukraine’s use of unmanned systems has transformed warfare on land, at sea and in the air. Ukraine’s “drone wall”, a layered defence of drones, has blunted Russia’s meat-grinder assaults, including motorcycle charges aimed at breaking through. By some estimates, drones now account for up to 80 percent of Russian battlefield casualties.
At sea, Ukraine has built a fleet of sea drones that has neutralised roughly a third of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, forced it into hiding and pushed much of the navy away from occupied Crimea. In the air, long-range Ukrainian drones regularly strike infrastructure and military sites more than 1,000 kilometres inside Russia.
But asymmetric advantages don’t always last forever. The Russians learn from their mistakes; once they do, they can steer the war machine to copy what works and scale it quickly. Moscow benefits from engineering support from China and Iran, along with access to North Korean labour to help with labour shortages. In 2023, Iranian assistance helped Russia establish a factory to produce Shahed-type drones, which have terrorised Ukrainian cities by the hundreds. Chinese suppliers provide components that feed into Russian drone manufacturing, and Chinese and Iranian engineers have reportedly offered technical support. Backed by this network of partners, Russia is learning to leverage technology and unmanned systems at scale to sustain its larger army. Russia also commands a far larger pool of personnel and has the revenues to keep recruiting. So long as oil and gas exports continue, the Kremlin can offer high pay to attract contract soldiers, replenishing units despite heavy losses.
Kyiv is not blameless for its personnel shortfalls. A lack of political will to mobilise in 2023 and the persistence of Soviet-era command practices contributed to poor decisions at the front. Yet frontline soldiers and volunteers are driving rapid innovation to save Ukrainian lives. The vision of frontline commanders is to deploy robots across the front, for these ground robots to take on the greatest risk and most dangerous missions. For Ukraine, this is a necessity as it seeks to stay ahead of a much larger, better-resourced enemy in an intensifying technological war. Over the past year, the kill zone has expanded from a few kilometres near the front to as far as 15 to 20 kilometres. The most dangerous task now is simply moving in and out of frontline positions, where Ukraine suffers many of its casualties. Losses during logistics and evacuation runs have been so heavy that units are short of pick-up trucks. Unjammed fibre-optic drones have increasingly been hunting anything that comes near the front. As a result, ground robots have stepped in to fill the gap.
Ground robots are taking on more of the logistical burden, delivering supplies to forward positions and reducing the need for soldiers to drive vehicles into the kill zone or for drone units to divert heavy bombers such as the “Baba Yaga” to resupply soldiers in the trenches.
In December 2024, Ukraine carried out its first documented all-robot assault against Russian positions. In July this year, the 3rd Assault Brigade said it conducted an operation using only drones and ground robots that led to Russian troops surrendering with no Ukrainian casualties. UGVs can also be employed in one-way strike roles, driving into enemy trenches or logistics bridges to detonate and destroy them and clearing mines.
In the future, soldiers expect that they will also serve as air defence, portable turrets that drive around and shoot down drones in the sky. This month, the 28th Mechanised Brigade unveiled what it says is the war’s first air-defence UGV: a remote-controlled ground robot mounting a 9K38 Igla MANPADS to engage low-flying aircraft while keeping crews under cover. In May, Ukraine used AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles mounted on Magura-7 naval drones to down two Russian Su-30 fighter jets over the Black Sea, which was the first recorded knockout of jets by sea drones.
Beyond operating in complex, countermeasure-rich environments, UGVs are hunted by drones, so Ukrainian units often run them at night to reduce detection. Connectivity is another major challenge. Latency and jamming force cash-strapped units to invest in more robust links such as mesh networks and Starlink to ensure reliable control for resupply and evacuation. It is also labour-intensive to deploy these robots, as each UGV mission typically requires a team of soldiers to supervise and support it.
However, as engineering problems are solved, costs come down and production scales, far greater numbers of ground robots are likely to appear along the frontline. Ukraine’s leadership hopes to deploy at least 15,000 of these robots by the end of 2025. But the Russians are also attempting to innovate and deploy ground robots as well, using these unmanned systems for similar functions.
For Ukraine, this is a necessity as it seeks to stay ahead of a much larger, better-resourced enemy in an intensifying technological war. If Kyiv’s planners get it right, a technological shield will emerge: a layered drone wall in the air, with robots manoeuvring along the front while soldiers remain hidden underground.
David Kirichenko is an Associate Research Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society. His work on warfare has been featured in the Atlantic Council, Centre for European Policy Analysis, and the Modern Warfare Institute, among many others.