Daria Synhaievska
March 10, 2025
Ukraine World
Since gaining independence, Ukraine has faced active attempts by Russia to create agent networks in various spheres of society.
Before the full-scale war, Russia tried everything else—information influence, infiltration of authorities, cultural influence, media, language, and more. These efforts failed, leading to the hot war in 2014 and then again in 2022.
Pro-Russian agents penetrated state bodies, military structures, media, business, and religious institutions. Their actions ranged from intelligence gathering and disinformation campaigns to sabotage and direct facilitation of military aggression.
The scale of this activity became even more apparent after 2014, and following the full-scale invasion in 2022, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) launched a large-scale campaign to expose Russian agents.
As stated by the study of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) to establish cells of Russian agent networks in Ukraine, the FSB recruited representatives of martial arts clubs, criminals (including drug dealers), former special forces personnel, security firms, and detective agencies in Ukraine.
In addition, according to the Border Guard Service, close ties between Russian officers and smuggling networks in Ukraine have been recorded.
And the movement of cash to sponsor different kinds of measures was facilitated by the diplomatic mail of countries friendly to Russia.
Penetration into State Structures
According to a study by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), Russia sought to place its agents in high positions in Ukraine so that they could manage their own networks directly from within the country.
Since the early 1990s, Russia has actively recruited agents in Ukrainian state institutions, using both financial incentives and ideological influence. This was particularly active in the security forces.
For example, in 2022, the SBU detained employees of the Cabinet of Ministers and the Chamber of Commerce and Industry who were passing secret documents related to Ukrainian defense policy to Russia.
In total, over 600 Russian agents were exposed in 2022–2023, of which at least 30% worked in government bodies.
A striking example is the activity of Viktor Medvedchuk, the leader of the Opposition Platform — For Life party, who had close ties to the Kremlin. Other politicians, such as Ilya Kiva and Viktor Chorny, are also suspected of collaborating with Russian intelligence services.
Their activities included spreading pro-Russian propaganda, organizing protests, and attempting to destabilize the situation in the country.
In addition to Andriy Derkach, sanctions have also been imposed on a number of other Ukrainian members of parliament, including Oleksandr Dubinsky, Oleksandr Onyshchenko, as well as prosecutor Kostiantyn Kulyk, former assistant prosecutor general Andriy Telizhenko, and three other Ukrainian citizens.
Use of Religious Structures
The Moscow Patriarchate’s Orthodox Church has become an important channel of Russia’s influence, providing pro-Russian propaganda among the population.
Individual members of the clergy were agents of the intelligence services. For example, in 2023, the SBU detained the abbot of a monastery who was passing data on the location of Ukrainian troops to the Russians.
This instrument was actively involved in а disinformation campaign, spreading the “de-Satanization” narrative regarding Ukraine.
It served to amplify the existing propaganda frenzy and inject a heightened sense of purpose into Russian military ranks.
Russia tried to frame its invasion as a religious crusade, which reveals a critical deficiency in the Russian military’s morale and a fundamental lack of clarity regarding their mission.
Earlier justifications, such as protecting “Russian-speakers” or adherents of the Moscow Patriarchate’s Orthodox Church, were employed in 2014. However, the latter’s influence has now diminished to insignificance. The shift towards a “holy war” narrative suggests a desperate attempt to compensate for this motivational void.
The notion that Russian soldiers are driven by Patriarch Kirill’s “Russian world” ideology appears to be a significant miscalculation.
Despite the doctrine’s formalization at the 2009 Russian People’s Council, where it depicted a distinct civilization rooted in shared language, cultural identity, and a specific historical narrative, it fails to resonate as a compelling call to arms.
Information Space
The Kremlin’s strategy involves seeding the media sphere with individuals and platforms designed to disseminate pro-Russian narratives, sow discord, and undermine trust in Ukrainian institutions.
This isn’t just about spreading propaganda; it’s a systematic effort to embed agents within the informational fabric of the nation, effectively turning the media into a tool for destabilization.
The case of Igor Guzhva and the creation of “Strana.ua” exemplifies a calculated Russian strategy to embed agents of influence within Ukraine’s informational ecosystem.
This operation wasn’t merely about establishing a news outlet; it was a deliberate attempt to construct a platform for disseminating Kremlin-aligned narratives and undermining Ukrainian societal cohesion.
Guzhva’s trajectory, moving from established publications like “Segodnya” and “Moskovskiye Novosti” to the helm of the Yanukovych-linked “Vesti” media holding, reveals a pattern of cultivating relationships with pro-Russian figures.
The subsequent transition of “Vesti” control to Oleksandr Klymenko, a former minister with close ties to the ousted regime, further solidified this pattern. “Strana.ua,” launched in 2016, emerged as the next phase of this strategy.
The composition of “Strana.ua’s” editorial team underscores its intended purpose. The inclusion of former “Vesti” personnel, such as Svitlana Kryukova, whose background included involvement in political campaigns, suggests a focus on shaping public opinion rather than impartial journalism.
Moreover, the presence of Iskander Khisamov, a Russian journalist with a documented history of propagandistic activities, highlights the direct infusion of Kremlin-backed messaging into the Ukrainian information space.
This operation represents a classic example of Russia’s hybrid warfare tactics.
By establishing seemingly independent media outlets staffed with individuals loyal to Russian interests, the Kremlin sought to create a conduit for disseminating disinformation, amplifying pro-Russian narratives.
It was not simply about news dissemination, but a strategic deployment of agents within the informational sphere to manipulate and influence the Ukrainian population.
Conclusions
Russia’s long-term infiltration into Ukraine through intelligence networks, media influence, religious structures, and state institutions reveals a deep-seated strategy aimed at weakening Ukraine from within. However, the full-scale invasion in 2022 exposed the fundamental flaws in Moscow’s approach.
One of Russia’s key miscalculations was the overestimation of its agent network’s effectiveness.
While these networks successfully infiltrated Ukrainian society, they failed to achieve their primary goal—subverting Ukraine’s resilience.
Despite Ukraine’s progress in countering Russian infiltration, challenges remain. The presence of residual agent networks and ongoing disinformation campaigns demand sustained vigilance.
This publication was compiled with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. It’s content is the exclusive responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Renaissance Foundation.
Daria Synhaievska is an analyst and journalist at Ukraine World.