By Alexander J. Motyl
30 March 2010
Published by The Wall Street Journal

As Ukraine's recently elected President Viktor Yanukovych prepares to
visit Washington in April, he will aim to project an image of stability,
confidence, and control. In reality, Mr. Yanukovych has committed a
series of mistakes that could doom his presidency, scare off foreign
investors, and thwart the country's modernization.

Mr. Yanukovych's first mistake was to violate the constitution by
changing the rules according to which ruling parliamentary coalitions
are formed, making it possible for his party to take the lead in
partnership with several others, including the Communists. That move
immediately galvanized the demoralized opposition that clustered around
his challenger in the presidential elections, former Prime Minister
Yulia Tymoshenko.

His second mistake was to appoint as prime minister his crony Mykola
Azarov, a tough bureaucrat whose name is synonymous with government
corruption, ruinous taxation rates, and hostility to small business. The
appointment dispelled any hopes Ukrainians had that Mr. Yanukovych would
promote serious economic reform.

Viktor Yanukovych's misrule is courting a second 'Orange Revolution.'

His third mistake was to agree to a cabinet consisting of 29 ministers
as opposed to 25 before-an impossibly large number that will only
compound its inability to engage in serious decision making. That the
cabinet contained not one woman-Mr. Azarov claimed that reform was not
women's work-only reinforced the image of the cabinet as a dysfunctional
boys' club.

His fourth mistake was to appoint two nonentities-a former state farm
manager, and an economics graduate from a Soviet agricultural
institute-to head the ministries of economy and finance. Meanwhile, he
created a Committee on Economic Reform, consisting of 24 members, to
develop a strategy of economic change. The size of the committee
guarantees that it will be a talk shop, while the incompetence of the
two ministers means that whatever genuinely positive ideas the Committee
develops will remain on paper.

His fifth mistake was to appoint the controversial Dmytro Tabachnik as
minister of education. Mr. Tabachnik has expressed chauvinist views that
democratically inclined Ukrainians regard as deeply offensive to their
national dignity, such as the belief that west Ukrainians are not real
Ukrainians; endorsing the sanitized view of Soviet history propagated by
the Kremlin; and claiming that Ukrainian language and culture flourished
in Soviet times. Unsurprisingly, many Ukrainians have reacted in the
same way that African Americans would react to KKK head David Duke's
appointment to such a position-with countrywide student strikes,
petitions, and demonstrations directed as much at Mr. Yanukovych as at
Mr. Tabachnik.

These five mistakes have effectively undermined Mr. Yanukovych's
legitimacy within a few weeks of his inauguration. The 45.5% of the
electorate that voted against him now feels vindicated; the 10-20% that
voted for him as the lesser of two evils now suspect that their fears of
Mrs. Tymoshenko's authoritarian tendencies were grossly exaggerated. And
everyone worries that Mr. Yanukovych and his band of Donbas-based "dons"
are ruthlessly pursuing the same anti-democratic agenda that sparked the
Orange Revolution of 2004.

Several other key dismissals and appointments have only reinforced this
view. The director of the Security Service archives-a conscientious
scholar who permitted unrestricted public access to documentation
revealing Soviet crimes-has been fired. The National Television and
Radio Company has been placed in the hands of a lightweight entertainer
expected to toe the line. Most disturbing perhaps, several of Mr.
Yanukovych's anti-democratically inclined party allies have been placed
in charge of provincial ministries of internal affairs-positions that
give them broad scope to clamp down on the liberties of ordinary
citizens.

Democratically inclined Ukrainians are increasingly persuaded that Mr.
Yanukovych wants to become Ukraine's version of Belarus's dictator,
Alexander Lukashenko. But Mr. Yanukovych's vision of strong-man rule
rests on a strategic, and possibly fatal, misunderstanding of Ukraine.

First, the Orange Revolution and five years of Viktor Yushchenko's
presidency empowered the Ukrainian population, endowing it with a
self-confidence that it lacked before 2004 and consolidating a vigorous
civil society consisting of professionals, intellectuals, students, and
businesspeople with no fear of the powers that be. Mr. Yanukovych's
efforts to establish strong-man rule already are, and will continue to
be, resisted and ridiculed by the general population.

Second, Ukraine's shambolic government apparatus cannot serve as the
basis of an effective authoritarian government. Tough talk alone will
fail to whip a bloated bureaucracy into shape. Worse, Ukraine's security
service and army are a far cry from those in Belarus. Mr. Yanukovych may
try to emulate Mr. Lukashenko, but without a strong bureaucracy and
coercive apparatus, he will fail.

Third, with an ineffective cabinet, all decision making will be
concentrated in Mr. Yanukovych's hands. Even if one ignores his
deficient education and poor grasp of facts, Mr. Yanukovych's
appointment of Mr. Tabachnik demonstrates that Ukraine's president is
either completely out of touch with his own country, or arrogantly
indifferent to public opinion.

Fourth, Ukraine is still in the throes of a deep economic crisis. If Mr.
Yanukovych does nothing to fix the economy, Ukraine may soon face
default, and mass discontent among his working class constituency in the
southeast is likely. If Mr. Yanukovych does embark on serious reforms,
that same constituency will suffer and strikes are certain. So
negotiating the crisis will require popular legitimacy-which Mr.
Yanukovych is rapidly squandering; a strong government-which he does not
have; and excellent judgment-which is also missing from the equation.

Indeed, if Mr. Yanukovych keeps on making anti-democratic mistakes, he
could very well provoke a second Orange Revolution. But this time the
demonstrators would consist of democrats, students, and workers. The
prospect of growing instability will do little to attract foreign
investors, while declining legitimacy, growing incompetence, and tub
thumping will fail to modernize Ukraine's industry, agriculture, and
education. Mr. Yanukovych could very well be an even greater failure as
president than Mr. Yushchenko.

Although the outlook is grim, it is not yet hopeless for Ukraine's new
president. He could still grasp a modest victory from the jaws of an
embarrassing defeat by ruling as the president, not of Donetsk, but of
all Ukraine. All he has to do is restrain his appetite for power and
learn to rule with the opposition and with the population. It's not so
complicated-it's democracy.

Mr. Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers
University-Newark.